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Abstract – Pseudorandom generators, which produce keystreams for stream ciphers by the exclusive-
or sum of outputs of alternately clocked linear feedback shift registers, are vulnerable to cryptanalysis.
In order to increase their resistance to attacks, we introduce a non-linear scrambler at the output
of these generators. Non-linear feedback shift register plays the role of the scrambler. In addition,
we propose Modified Alternating Step Generator with a non-linear scrambler (MASG1S) built with
non-linear feedback shift register and regularly or irregularly clocked linear feedback shift registers
with non-linear filtering functions.
1 Introduction
Pseudorandom generators of a keystream composed of linear feedback shift registers
(LFSR) are basic components of classical stream ciphers. An LFSR with properly
selected feedback gives a sequence of maximal period and good statistical properties but
has a low linear complexity. It is vulnerable to the Berlecamp-Massey [1] algorithm and
can be easily reconstructed having a short output segment. Stop and go or alternating
clocking of shift registers are two of the methods to increase linear complexity of the
keystream. Other techniques introduce non-linearity to the feedback or to the output
of the shift register. All these methods increase resistance of keystream generators to
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In the alternating step generator (ASG) [3], the de Bruijn sequence [2] controls
the irregular clocking of two linear feedback shift registers. The ASG is vulnerable to
various attacks [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], so there are many modifications of this
generator [14, 15, 16, 17]. In [19] we proposed the next three modifications: MASG,
MASG0 and MASG1. These modified alternating step generators give sequences with
maximal period, good statistical properties and higher linear complexity than the ASG.
The introduction of non-linear functions to the generator increases its resistance to the
attacks. However, from the analysis of the attacks we conclude that at the output
of the alternating step generator a linear function (XOR) should be replaced with a
non-linear one. Proposed in [19] MASG2 with non-linear combining function at the
output gives non-random sequences. Therefore, we have undertaken further work to
improve the MASG family. In this paper, we describe selected attacks on alternating
step generators. Then we propose another modification of such generators in order
to increase their resistance to these attacks. The modification consists in adding a
non-linear scrambler at the output of alternating step generators. We constructed the
non-linear scrambler with the maximal period of non-linear feedback shift register. The
MASG1S keystream generator, with an implemented non-linear scrambler, non-linear
filtering functions and initialization method is particular realization of this idea.
2 Alternating Step Generators
The alternating step generator (ASG) [3] is a pseudorandom generator of binary
keystream sequences, where the concept of stop-and-go shift registers was adapted.
The ASG consists of two linear feedback shift registers, alternately clocked by the
de Bruijn sequence [2]. The de Bruijn sequence of the period K = 2k can be easily
obtained by adding zero bit after k − 1 zeros in the sequence with the period 2k − 1
from the LFSR (the modified de Bruijn sequence). The exclusive-or sum (XOR) of bits
from the irregularly clocked LFSRs produces output bits from the generator, as it is
presented in Fig. 1.
Rysunek 1. The Alternating Step Generator
For properly selected feedback polynomials, the output sequence from the ASG has
a large period (1) and a high linear complexity (2):








k−1 < L ≤ (m1 +m2)2
k (2)
We can observe growth of the linear complexity of the output sequence from the
ASG in comparison to the sequence obtained from a simple LFSR (where the linear
complexity is equal to its length – m1 or m2 in this case).
The ASG is vulnerable to various attacks. There are many variants of correlation
and algebraic attacks and the best two are described in [4] and [9]. Asymptotic time
complexity of these attacks is O(m222m/3) and the data complexity is O(22m/3), where
m is the length of the shortest register in the ASG. Time complexity of the algebraic at-
tack described in [12] is much higher, however this attack can be applied if polynomials
of irregularly clocked registers are unknown, while requiring less output bits. These
attacks exploit dependencies between the output sequence (for the known plaintext)
and the internal states of irregularly controlled registers.
In order to resist the ASG against these attacks, there are proposed many modifica-
tions of this generator. In the alternating step generator [14] ASG(r, s), two positive
integers r and s determine how many times one register (LFSR1) or the other one
(LFSR2) is clocked. In [11] the authors showed, that the ASG(r, s) is as secure as
the original ASG. Afterwards, Kanso proposed in [15] and [16] the MGCCASG and
MCCASG constructions based on the ASG(r, s), where the integers r and s are variable
– dependent on a key or on a function of a state of the controlling register. Another
method of improving the ASG, proposed in [10], was to exchange some LFSRs for fe-
edback with carry shift registers (FCSR) and the XOR sum to be added to the (ADD)
as an output function. This modification of the ASG does not improve its security
substantially.
2.1 Modified Alternating k-Generators
Modified alternating k-generators (MAGk) were proposed in [17]. Output sequence
from MAGk is produced by the XOR sum of binary sequences from all three shift
registers, as presented in Fig. 2. Feedback functions of these registers can be linear or
non-linear.
Rysunek 2. The Modified Alternating k-Generator
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There are more modifications of the MAGk proposed in [11]:
(1) MAGk1 – the function of state bits of the controlling register determines
how many times controlled registers are clocked – this generator is similar to
MCCASG [16];
(2) MAGk2 – the binary output of the function (inner control function) of state
bits of the controlling register determines alternating clocking of controlled
registers – this generator was analyzed in [12], where the authors showed that
its security is not better that of the original ASG;
(3) MAGk3 – the output from the generator is produced by the function (output
generating function) of binary states of all three registers: one controlling and
two controlled – this generator is similar to our concept described in [20] and
to the MASG2 described in 19.
2.2 The MASG Family
In 18 and [19] we proposed a family of modified alternating step generators (MASG).
We concentrated on selecting proper non-linear functions – as feedback functions and
the others as filtering and combining functions. In [21, 22, 23] there are described
methods for constructing non-linear feedback functions for shift registers. At this time
we can achieve registers with the maximal period for the length up to n = 31. These
registers give sequences with the linear complexity close to the period, maximum 2n−2
Our first approach to modification of the ASG was to replace controlled registers
(LFSR1 and LFSR2 in Fig. 1) by the non-linear feedback shift registers (NLFSR) and
we achieved:
• MASG – the alternating step generator, where the output is produced by the
XOR sum of binary sequences from two alternately clocked NLFSRs;
• MASG0 – the alternating step generator, where the output is produced by
the XOR sum of binary sequences from all three registers (like in MAGk).
These MASGs produce binary sequences with a better linear complexity than the
ASG, but we should find NLFSRs with a greater length than 31 (n > 64). These
registers should give sequences with the maximal period and the high non-linear order.
The non-linear Boolean functions are often used as filtering or combining functions
for linear feedback shift registers in order to increase security of keystream generators.
The functions proposed in [18] and [19] have high non-linearity and many non-linear
components in their algebraic normal form. We used them in our second approach to
modification of the ASG and we achieved:
• MASG1 is the MAGk, where all linear feedback shift registers are equipped
with non-linear filtering functions;
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• MASG2 is the MAGk with a non-linear output function.
Output sequences from these constructions have better linear complexities than the
ASG. MASG1 gives sequences, which seem to be random, while MASG2 did not pass
randomness tests.
3 Attacks on the Alternating Step Generators
There are many attacks on the alternating step generators. The most of them are
divide-and-conquer attacks with a known plaintext. The main goal is to find initial
states of shift registers having a portion of the output sequence.
3.1 Divide-And-Conquer Attack
Divide-and-conquer attack was presented by C. G. Gu¨nther in [3], when describing
original ASG. The basis of the attack is that the output sequence may be divided
into two parts, derived from regularly clocked registers. Then these subsequences can
be tested for a low linear complexity in an easy way using the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm. If a tested sequence with period of 2k is consistent with a sequence from
clock control register, then linear complexity of component sequences for irregularly
clocked registers is lower than their periods. The complexity of the divide-and-conquer
attack, if one knows only feedbacks of the register, for which initial state is searched, is
O(min2(m1,m2)2
k). When one knows feedbacks of all registers, then the complexity of
the attack is O(min(m1,m2)2k) and instead of linear complexity – a linear consistency
test is applied. In both cases, a guessing clock control register is necessary.
3.2 Edit Distance Correlation Attack
To carry out the edit distance correlation attack [5], it must be assumed, that feed-
backs of irregularly clocked registers are known and the clocking sequence is characte-
rized by a uniform distribution of bits 0 and 1. The attack involves searching the entire
space of initial states of alternately clocked registers with known feedbacks, followed by
verifying whether they are appropriate. Verification is based on the Hamming distance
between the computed segment of the output sequence (obtained as the output of the
generator with fixed states of alternately clocked registers) and the segment obtained
as a result of the attack with a known plaintext. This distance is the minimum number
of necessary subtractions (edit distance) in the computed segment, which allows obta-
ining the known output sequence. Minimum is calculated for all (2k) states of clock
control register. There exists [5] an effective method of calculating the distance and
it is possible to determine the probability, that this distance is equal to 0, i.e. when
initial sequences give the known output sequence of the generator for the specified clock
control sequence. This probability increases with the length of the known segment of
the output sequence. The length of required known segment of the output sequence is
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linear in relation to the sum of lengths of irregularly clocked registers. The number of
multiple solutions is minimized when the available output sequence is 4 times longer
than the total length of registers, which are searched. The computational complexity
of this attack is O((m1 +m2)22m1+m2). The third register can be restored with the
complexity O(20.27k), if only a sufficiently long segment of the sequence is available.
3.3 Edit Probability Correlation Attack
The edit probability correlation attack on individual irregularly clocked registers in
the Gu¨nther generator was proposed in [6]. The attack uses probability (edit probabi-
lity) that a given segment of the output sequence of the generator has been produced
from the sequence derived from the regularly clocked register with the predetermined
initial state. Finding the initial state of one of the irregularly clocked registers can be
done without knowledge of the other one and without knowledge about the state of
clock control register. The edit probability correlation attack requires a known output
sequence with the length minimum 4 times longer than that of state of the register,
which is searched. The complexity of calculating this probability is the square of the
length of output sequence. The computational complexity of this attack, in order to find
both initial states of the irregularly clocked registers is O(max2(m1+m2)2max(m1+m2)).
For long registers, the complexity of edit probability correlation attack is much lower
than that of the edit distance correlation attack.
3.4 Johansson’s Attack
In [4] the attack with reduced complexity on generators with irregularly clocked
registers was proposed. In the output sequence of the generator, a segment of consecu-
tive zeros (or ones) is searched. It is assumed that half of them come from one of the
irregularly clocked registers. This occurs with a certain probability. The remaining
bits are obtained by exhaustive search. The optimal computational complexity of this
attack is O(m222/3m) and requires O(22/3m) bits of sequence, where m is the length
of the register, which is searched: m1 or m2. These complexities apply to the attack
both the first and the second irregularly clocked registers.
In another scenario, the segment of a number of ones (or zeros) in the output sequence
is searched and it is assumed that half of ones (or zeros) of that segment has originated
from one register, and the rest (ones and zeros) from the other. This occurs with
a certain probability. The complexities of the attack according to this scenario are
similar to these mentioned above for one register. Finding the initial state of the
second register may require better quantity of calculations.
3.5 New Reduced Complexity Attack
New reduced complexity attack is based on low resistance of Gu¨nther generator
to sampling [9]. The low resistance to sampling indicates the possibility of effective
finding all possible register preimages A(Zn) of a generator, for a given segment of
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output sequence (Zn). Generally, this resistance is defined as 2−n, where n is the
maximum available length of output sequence.
In order to execute the attack, first, the set of all possible states for a given segment
of output sequence of length n is searched. Algorithm for finding this set is based on
the divide-and-conquer attack with the parity test. For all states of the initial clock
control register, the output segment is divided into bits, originated from particular
irregularly clocked registers. Then all states of irregularly clocked registers are checked
if they can generate separate bits – if so, the possible states of three registers are added
to the set of A(Zn), which is searched.
The average number of initial states of Gu¨nther generator for a given segment of
output sequence is 23m−n or n ≤ 3m where m is the length of registers, n – the length
of segment of output sequence. The computational complexity of the algorithm is
O(max(2m, 23m−n)). The complexity is determined by the factor 2m when the size of
a set of possible initial states is ≤ 2m, otherwise it is determined by the value 23m−n.
This algorithm can be effective and it shows low resistance of generator to sampling,
where n ≤ 2m, that is, when resistance to sampling is about 2−2m, where 2m is the
total length of irregularly clocked registers. In a modified version of the algorithm,
T random elements of set A(Zn) can be found. However, in this case the question
is how big this set should be to include a correct initial state of one of the registers.
In [9], formulas (2) and (3) determine the probability and the conditional entropy
of solutions. Generally, the reduced complexity attack is to find initial states of the
Gu¨nther generator among a set of possible initial states. The most likely solutions are
found using the edit probability calculated for each possible initial state and a given
segment of a output sequence. The complexity of this attack for a random segment of
output sequence with the weight of w and the length n is O(m22mγ), where m is the
length of the register, which is searched, γ depends on m and γ < 1. For γ < 1 and
for h(w/n) = 2/3 the attack is similar to that in [4] and the asymptotic complexities
are as follows: computational O(m222/3m), memory O(22/3m). In comparison with the
Johansson attack, the reduced complexity attack is more flexible in terms of useful
output sequences, whose weights can be freely chosen.
3.6 Algebraic Attack
The algebraic attack on stream ciphers with irregularly clocked registers was pre-
sented in [8]. The complexity of the attack on the original Gu¨nther generator is
O((m1
3 + m2
3)). In [11, 12, 13] there were described further similar attacks on
the modified generators with the alternately clocked registers, as MAGk2 or ASG(r, s).
Such attacks have higher computational complexity than the Johansson’s attack, but
they need a shorter, known output sequence. They use a linear relationship (XOR)
between the sequences from registers at the output of the generator and they find sequ-
ences of individual irregularly clocked registers by searching among all possible initial
states of clock control register. In the case of the attack on the modified k-generator of
the second type: MAGk2, for known feedbacks of registers, the attack needs k+m1+m2
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bits of output sequence to find the initial states of registers. The complexity of the
attack is then . When feedbacks of registers are not known, it must be the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm additionally used, hence it is required to know k+2m1+2m2 bits of
output sequence to execute the attack and the complexity is O((m12 +m22)2k+1). To
avoid such attack, the output of the generator should not be defined either by a linear
function or by a function that will approximately describe linear relationships between
the output of the generator and the outputs of individual registers.
4 Non-linear Feedback Shift Register as a Scrambler
In the previous chapter, we described attacks on the alternating step generators.
These attacks explore linearity of the transformation at the output and a low linear
complexity of shift registers. Hence, in the MASG family we proposed non-linear
functions – some as non-linear feedbacks of shift registers, others as filtering or combi-
ning functions of linear feedback shift registers. The known non-linear feedback shift
registers, which give maximal length output sequences, are too short for practical ap-
plications. Therefore, MASG and MASG0 are the constructions, which do not ensure
sufficient resistance to the attacks. Also MASG2 with the non-linear combining func-
tion gives a sequence, which is not random. Hence, the MASG1 built with the linear
feedback shift registers with the non-linear filtering functions is the best choice from
the MASG family. MASG1 can be the basis for the construction of secure generator
for stream cipher. The ASG, MAGk and MASG1 have linear functions at the output.
The analysis, given in section 3, suggests non-linear transformation at this point. So
we propose non-linear multiplicative scrambler as an output function of the alternating
step generators. As the scrambler, we use a non-linear feedback shift register with the
maximal period and the linear complexity close to the period. The general scheme of
the generator with the scrambler is presented in Fig. 3.
Rysunek 3. Generator with the non-linear scrambler
The output sequence from the alternating step generator is applied to the input of
the scrambler, where bit after bit is added (mod 2) to its non-linear feedback. The
example of the non-linear feedback function of the scrambler might look like this [23]
f31:
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s0, s1, . . . , s30 are the bits of the NLFSR state register;
s¯i = si + 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , 30; the addition and multiplication are performed
using modulo 2 operation.
4.1 MASG1 with the Scrambler
The scheme of the MASG1 with the non-linear scrambler (MASG1S) is presented in
Fig. 4. Controlling (LFSR0) and controlled (LFSR1 and LFSR2) shift registers have
linear feedbacks and are equipped with the non-linear filtering functions gb0, gb1 and
gb2 [19]. The controlling register and non-linear feedback shift register are clocked
regularly. The controlled registers are clocked alternately. Lengths of LFSR0, LFSR1,
LFSR2 and NLFSR are k = 127, m1 = 131, m2 = 137 and n = 31 respectively.
Rysunek 4. MASG1S
4.2 Initializing the MASG1S
MASG1S requires 426 bits for the initial states of registers. The key for the con-
temporary stream ciphers should be in the range 160-256 bits. So let us assume that
the key bits are assigned to the state registers of LFSR0, LFSR1, LFSR2 and NLFSR,
according to the Table 1. The remaining cells of the state registers are filled with
one-bits (this protects them from filling only by zeros).
After initial filling, according to the rules described above, the generator is cloc-
ked 853 times. The output of the MASG1S is added (mod 2) to all linear registers
(controlling and controlled ones). During this process, the generator does not produce
output bits, LFSR0 and NLFSR are clocked regularly, LFSR0 and NLFSR are clocked
alternately. The scheme of the MASG1S initializing process is presented in Fig. 5.
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Tablica 1. Distribution of the key to the registers
Key length 160 192 224 256
LFSR0 43 53 64 75
LFSR1 43 54 64 75
LFSR2 43 54 65 75
NLFSR 31 31 31 31
Rysunek 5. Initializing MASG1S
4.3 Randomness Properties
We checked experimentally randomness of keystreams produced by alternating
step generators: ASG, MAGk and MASG1 with the non-linear scrambler (3): ASGS,




(3) two bit test
(4) 8-bit poker test
(5) 16-bit poker test
(6) runs test (for max 22 consecutive zeros or ones)
(7) autocorrelation test (for shifted sequences by 1, 2, …, 8 bits)
We tested 10 GB sequences produced by the ASGS, MAGkS and MASG1S starting
with the randomly selected initial states. Additionally, we took 10 GB sequences from
the random number generator SGCL-100M [26]. As the reference distributions the tests
use the chi-square distributions and the standard normal distribution. The resulting
statistics were split into 8 classes according to the range of significance level as it is
shown in Table 2. For the popular level of significance =0.05, sequences pass tests if
their statistics are a class A, B or C.
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Tablica 2. Classes of statistics
Class A B C A B C D E F G H
% 95 80 10 5 2.5 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.1
The obtained results of experiments for overall sequences are given in Table 3. Table
4 contains the percentages of classes of statistics for 1 MB subsequences of the examined
sequences.
Tablica 3. Classes of statistics for 10GB sequences
Test no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ASGS A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
MAGkS A A A A A A A A A C A B A A
MASG1S A B A B A B C A A A A A A C
SGCL-100M A A A A A A B A A A C A A B
Tablica 4. Percentages of classes for 1MB subsequences
Class ABC A B C D E F G H
ASGS 94.97 79.61 10.39 4.97 2.61 1.55 0.42 0.36 0.09
MAGkS 94.96 79.48 10.59 4.89 2.60 1.44 0.47 0.42 0.12
MASG1S 94.98 79.82 10.52 4.91 2.59 1.46 0.48 0.38 0.11
Randomness tests results for ASGS, MAGkS and MASG1S are what we expected for
random sequences:
• all sequences passed tests with the significance level α = 0.05,
• percentages of classes are close to those expected (Table 2),
• results for alternating step generators with the non-linear scrambler are simi-
lar to those for the random number generator.
4.4 Resistance of Alternating Step Generators with Scrambler to Attacks
Attacks to the alternating step generators explore linearity of the XOR transforma-
tion at the output and linearity of feedback functions of shift registers. These known
plaintext divide-and-conquer attacks rely on matching the sequence fragments to the
registers in order to guess their initial states and the key. To protect alternating step
generators from these types of attacks, we propose to add a non-linear scrambler to
their outputs. We assume the worst case when the plaintext and feedback functions
are known. Then, an attacker will have access to the output of the generator, but
not to the XOR sum of the sequences of alternating step registers. Complexity of
the attacks will increase by the factor that determines guessing the initial state of the
non-linear feedback shift register i.e. minimum by 2n−1 for register of length n. We
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propose non-linear feedback register as the scrambler. We constructed maximal period
non-linear feedback shift registers up to n = 31. Currently known registers of such
type have length n = 34. These are short registers and it seems, that complexity of
the attacks will not increase significantly. However, the attacker should check if the
initial state of the NLFSR is proper. That requires constructing the test. This will not
be easy due to the random properties of the sequences before and after the scrambler.
Presumedly, high complexity and low efficiency of the test leads to increased resistance
of the generators to the attacks. But it requires further work.
Additionally, in the MASG1S we used non-linear filtering function to each linear feed-
back shift register. The functions increase linear complexity of the sequences from these
registers and protect them against the Berlecamp-Massey algorithm. non-linear scram-
bler, non-linear filtering functions and initialization method causes that the MASG1S
is resistant to the attacks dedicated to the alternating step generators.
5 Summary
In this paper, we have analyzed the attacks on the alternating step generators. These
attacks explore linearity of shift registers and linearity of the output XOR function.
In order to increase resistance to the attacks we proposed the non-linear scrambler
at the output of the alternating step generators. Such scrambler can be built with
the non-linear feedback shift register, which gives a sequence of full period and linear
complexity close to the period.
We also used the non-linear scrambler at the output of the modified alternating step
generator MASG1. The resulting keystream generator MASG1S is built of one non-
linear feedback shift register and three linear feedback shift registers, each with a non-
linear filtering function. We proposed the initializing method for the MASG1S . This
method produces initial states of shift registers from a key, before starting keystream
generation. Adding non-linear filtering functions, non-linear scrambler and initializa-
tion to the generator substantially increases its resistance to the divide-and-conquer
attacks. In general, the complexity of the attacks on alternating step generators will
increase by the factor, which determines the difficulty of finding a proper initial state
of the non-linear feedback shift register at the output (we assume that the plaintext
and feedback functions are known). It does not seem to be a complex problem for
short NLFSR, but the sequences before and after scrambler have good random pro-
perties. Hence, it will be not easy to find out, that the initial state of the NLFSR is
correct. The complexity of the appropriate test will be the subject for further work. We
checked randomness of the alternating step generators with a scrambler. The ASGS,
MAGkS and MASG1S give keystreams, which pass randomness testes. The test results
are similar to those for the true random number generator. Thus, generators with a
non-linear scrambler can be used as keystream generators in stream ciphers.
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